The Detention Dilemma
In an effort to ensure stability for Iraq, Multinational Force (MNF) troops,
most of them from the U.S. Army or Marine Corps, regularly raid civilian homes
in the middle of the night, seeking individuals they suspect pose an imperative
threat to security.
According to dozens of released
detainees and families of detainees, house raids are traumatic events.
In the typical raid, soldiers smash open doors and break through windows, storm
through the house in search of weapons or contraband, and round up all of the
inhabitants for questioning in a matter of minutes. Soldiers often take all
of the men outside in their nightclothes, regardless of weather conditions,
force them to the ground and hand-tie them. After the soldiers have finished
searching the house, they take some or all of the men to the nearest military
base, frequently without providing any explanation to the men or their family.
Once captured, the MNF labels these persons
“security detainees” (or “security internees”) and
enters them into a convoluted and unjust
detention
system, operated by the U.S. military. Released security detainees
whom CPT members have interviewed report that the majority of abuse within the
detention system takes place at primary holding facilities—cells at military
bases peppered throughout Iraq where detainees spend their first few days. Soldiers
often verbally harass and/or physically abuse detainees, crowd them in small,
unsanitary rooms or tents, leave them hooded and hand-tied for long hours (sometimes
days), and deprive them of food and water. These initial holding facilities
are also the sites of preliminary interrogations, which released detainees report
have involved further mistreatment and sometimes wanton abuse. (A report
by Amnesty International corroborates the trend of abuse at primary holding
facilities.)
According to former Coalition Forces (CF) officials in Iraq with whom CPTers
have spoken, if the initial interrogators determine detainees do indeed pose
a threat to security, then the detention system operators eventually transfer
detainees to a central detention facility, where they register the detainees
in the processing system and hold them without formal charges for indefinite
periods. Detainees’ names never show up on any lists until their processing
in the central system is complete, which can take weeks.
Between May 2003 and October 2003, the CF held several thousand security detainees
in a variety of locations throughout Iraq. At that time, CPTers discovered that
the CF held most of these detainees at Camp Bucca, just outside of Umm Qasr
on the Persian Gulf, and at Camp Cropper inside the Baghdad International Airport
(BIAP). The CF only permitted family visitations at Camp Bucca, and prohibited
detainees from receiving legal counsel at all facilities. In November 2003,
the CF began consolidating most of the security detainees into camps inside
the Abu Ghraib prison compound, just west of Baghdad. Released detainees reported
that the CF denied detainees access to legal counsel at Abu Ghraib as well,
and family visitations there were scant until February 2003.
In May 2004, CPTers obtained a document from a Coalition Provisional Authority
official summarizing all registered detainees held by the CF/MNF in Iraq. The
document showed that at the time, they held 4,187 detainees in Abu Ghraib, 2,380
in Camp Bucca, 92 at BIAP, and 1,090 at several small bases across Iraq. The
document further showed that as of May 2004, the CF/MNF had at one time or another
detained 38,494 persons in Iraq.
Since the transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Government of Iraq (IGI), the
MNF has reportedly moved most security detainees to Camp
Bucca. The MNF holds High
Value Detainees (HVDs)—i.e. detainees suspected of posing the greatest
threat to security or of knowing the most valuable information—at Camp
Cropper, as did the CF previously.
On
August 29, 2004, the MNF officials stated, “The multinational force
currently detains about 5,300 people for security reasons.”
Some of the released security detainees CPTers have interviewed testified that
the CF/MNF intensely interrogated them in one or more central detention facilities,
while others reported that the CF/MFN did not even ask a single question.
All of those who reported to have spent time in Camp Cropper said it was very
difficult: poor sanitation, little or no bedding, little and/or poor food and
water, and frequent interrogations—including abuse and, in a few cases,
torture. Most of those who reported having spent time in Camp Bucca reported
that it was also difficult, but better than any of the other facilities they
stayed in: very high temperatures in the day and very low temperatures at night,
poor bedding, crowded housing and occasional mild abuse, but decent food, plenty
of water, and freedom to exercise. Several released detainees who spent time
in Camp Bucca also reported that one U.S. Army Major who managed the detention
facility was particularly kind and helpful.
An August
16, 2004 press release from the MNF Detainee Operations Public Affairs Office
reported that the MNF only recently expanded its confidential review board of
three top-ranking U.S. military commanders to include six commissioners from
the IGI, but it is still presided over by a U.S. military official. All
of the thousands of security detainee cases are funneled through this board,
which meets at least three days a week. All of the board’s recommendations
must be cleared through Major General Geoffrey Miller, the Deputy Commanding
General for Detainee Operations for the MNF. [One of Major General Geoffrey
Miller’s first orders after he took command of the detention system in
Iraq in April 2004 was to ban the use of hoods for detainees. CPT can only testify
to the use of hoods before this order.]
The stated goal of the board is to review each detainee’s case every three
months. As of August 29, the board had already reviewed 300 cases, and will
consider another 3,700 “eligible” security detainees. Upon deciding
to continue to hold a detainee, the board may or may not issue formal charges.
Of the 5,300 security detainees, 700 are already subject to criminal charges
and will be transferred to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Therefore, as
of August 29, the MNF still holds 4,600 security detainees in legal limbo. About
600 of those are apparently ineligible for review by the board.
Click here to read testimonies
from released detainees and families of detainees.
Click here to read CPT reports, statistics
and patterns reported by detainees and families of detainees.
Fate of Families
Families
of security detainees have little access to information as to the whereabouts
or health conditions of their loved ones. Some do not even know if their family
member is alive. While a list of detainees is published in Arabic on the Internet,
most Iraqi families do not have access to the Internet. And while the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is sending “Safe and Well” cards
between detainees and their families, it takes a long time for the ICRC to process
these messages since their main office for Iraq is in Amman, Jordan. Usually
the only news a family can get about their detained relative comes when a fellow
prisoner is released.
The absence of such information and the uncertainty of indefinite separation
contribute to the already enormous hardships experienced by families of the
detained. Having lost their main income earners, many families must fend off
destitution. Some have become homeless, many feel vulnerable to criminal activity,
and all face increased emotional stress. Frightened children wonder when their
fathers will come home and dread the arrival of bedtime for fear of another
house raid.
Click here to read testimonies
of detainees’ family members.
Justice under International Humanitarian Law
While
some detainees included in this campaign may have been involved in armed resistance
to the U.S.-led occupation, CPT is confident that most have not. Regardless,
for CPT, the concern is one of just and humane treatment, rather than the guilt
or innocence of a particular detainee. Every detainee is a human being and is
entitled to certain protections and rights under international humanitarian
law.
Several binding
international legal codes apply to the detainee situation in Iraq.
Before the transfer of sovereignty to the IGI on June 28, 2004, the CPA was
the formal Occupying Power of Iraq, and thus bound by the Geneva Conventions.
Coalition Forces cited Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as grounds
for holding security detainees. The Geneva Conventions in general allow significant
leeway regarding actions an Occupying Power can take for reasons of security.
However, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (UNSCR
1546) specifically states that as of June 30, 2004, the Coalition’s
occupation of Iraq has ended, although it states that the MNF has “the
authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of
security and stability in Iraq.” The Geneva Conventions only apply in
situations of international war and occupation. When applied, the Geneva Conventions
often effectively trump other international laws, but outside of such situations,
all relevant international laws apply in full force.
International humanitarian laws which apply to the current situation of detainees
in Iraq include: Basic
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Body
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment, Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
and International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. Among other things, these laws require the
MNF to release all detainees in Iraq as of June 30, 2004—or at the very
least, to clarify the legal status of any detainees the MNF continues to hold
and explain why it still holds them.
As of the end of August 2004, the MNF has publicly announced that 700 of 5,300
detainees they hold are subject to criminal charges and will be processed by
the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. They stated that the US-led Combined
Review and Release Board (CRRB) has already reviewed 300 detainees, but did
not state their decision on them. They further stated that the CRRB plans to
review an additional 3,700 “eligible” security detainees. That leaves
at least 4,600 detainees in legal limbo, 600 of which the MNF has no stated
intention to even review.
According to the above international laws, the IGI may hold security detainees
captured before June 30, 2004 if and only if the IGI issues them formal charges
according to law codes that are in good standing with international law. In
addition, among other things, the IGI must allow legal counsel for all detainees
and process them swiftly through a judicial system that meets the standards
set forth by international law. As of the end of August 2004, the IGI has not
issued formal charges for some 4,600 security detainees. CPT cannot verify whether
the IGI allows security detainees legal counsel. The CRRB so far reviews detainees
at a rate of 300 per week, but their any recommendation for release they make
must be cleared through US Army Major General Geoffrey Miller.
By the above international laws, the IGI may relinquish control over some of
its detainees to another body, if and only if that body adopts the formal charges
issued by the IGI or itself issues charges in accord with Iraqi or international
law codes, allows legal counsel for all detainees, institutes an appropriate
judicial system and processes detainees through it swiftly, and adheres to all
other relevant international laws. In an Annex to UNSCR 1546, Iraqi Prime Minister
Iyad ’Allawi authorized the MNF to detain persons in Iraq where they deem
it “necessary for imperative reasons of security.” Although this
language is taken from the Fourth Geneva Convention, PM Allawi’s letter
does not ascribe to the MNF other privileges or responsibilities of an Occupying
Power provided by the Geneva Conventions (such as withholding legal counsel
for security detainees).
In other words, neither the body nor the annex to UNSCR 1546 gives the MNF or
the IGI license to violate any relevant international law. Nevertheless, both
the MNF and the IGI remain in standing violation of several international laws,
citing UNSCR 1546 as justification for their present actions.
Click here
for more information on international humanitarian law.
|