IRAQ: Security in Iraqi Kurdistan
January 16th, 2008
in:
CPTnet
16 January 2008
IRAQ: Security in Iraqi Kurdistan
by the CPT Iraq Team: Anita David, Peggy Gish, Cliff Kindy, Michele Naar-Obed
What is the security situation in Iraqi Kurdistan? How does it affect the possibility for continued work and delegations here? Since returning two and a half months ago, the Iraq team has come to the following conclusions about the security here for Kurds and the team.
Security for Kurds in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq (the three governants of Dahuk, Erbil and Suleimaniyah), is judged in light of the Baathist regime’s end. Kurds feel any current difficulties are better than the discrimination, terror, and death experienced during the Anfal campaign waged by Saddam Hussein's regime. But practically, the KRG does not face the suicide bombings, kidnappings and random violence so prevalent in the south and central parts of Iraq. The 170,000 Kurdish Peshmerga and an unknown number of Asaish security police and other patrols staff checkpoints on highways, monitor the population, and tightly control the transit of strangers, and the security of all Kurds. The only ones who do not experience this as "security" are Kurdish resistance groups and other voices of dissent (e.g. Islamic groups and journalists) that have been silenced, jailed, and disappeared, even in recent years. Presently, the Turkish border is a potentially volatile region that will require close attention.
Security for the CPT team in Kurdistan was cause for very careful planning as the team returned in October 2007. The kidnapping of early 2007, which happened fifty miles outside the KRG, led to a great deal of caution and the development of strict security guidelines. But CPT in the KRG now has not had to be in a low-profile survival mode as the team was in Baghdad. CPT women and men are free to dress much as they wish—no need for women to wear an abaya and head covering. Over the past two months, CPTers have found little to cause them concern about their safety within the KRG. They have walked the streets of Suleimaniya alone without qualms, have traveled from Erbil alone, and as a team have ventured into new areas like Halabja, and within four miles of the Iranian border. Therefore, the CPT team has relaxed the tight guidelines set prior to our return to Iraq. The team does listen to local voices of caution about particular areas, assesses those warnings, and then decides how to respond. Contacts have urged us to stay away from areas with land mines, especially along the borders, and the Penjeune area on the Iraq-Iran border.
CPT has never hosted a delegation to the KRG, and few other delegations come here, but travel by bus, taxi, and hired drivers is safe, so the movement of a delegation would not be a security concern. This project is operating in a security situation that is better at the present, we believe, than the Colombia and Palestine projects.
16 January 2008
IRAQ: Security in Iraqi Kurdistan
by the CPT Iraq Team: Anita David, Peggy Gish, Cliff Kindy, Michele Naar-Obed
What is the security situation in Iraqi Kurdistan? How does it affect the possibility for continued work and delegations here? Since returning two and a half months ago, the Iraq team has come to the following conclusions about the security here for Kurds and the team.
Security for Kurds in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq (the three governants of Dahuk, Erbil and Suleimaniyah), is judged in light of the Baathist regime’s end. Kurds feel any current difficulties are better than the discrimination, terror, and death experienced during the Anfal campaign waged by Saddam Hussein's regime. But practically, the KRG does not face the suicide bombings, kidnappings and random violence so prevalent in the south and central parts of Iraq. The 170,000 Kurdish Peshmerga and an unknown number of Asaish security police and other patrols staff checkpoints on highways, monitor the population, and tightly control the transit of strangers, and the security of all Kurds. The only ones who do not experience this as "security" are Kurdish resistance groups and other voices of dissent (e.g. Islamic groups and journalists) that have been silenced, jailed, and disappeared, even in recent years. Presently, the Turkish border is a potentially volatile region that will require close attention.
Security for the CPT team in Kurdistan was cause for very careful planning as the team returned in October 2007. The kidnapping of early 2007, which happened fifty miles outside the KRG, led to a great deal of caution and the development of strict security guidelines. But CPT in the KRG now has not had to be in a low-profile survival mode as the team was in Baghdad. CPT women and men are free to dress much as they wish—no need for women to wear an abaya and head covering. Over the past two months, CPTers have found little to cause them concern about their safety within the KRG. They have walked the streets of Suleimaniya alone without qualms, have traveled from Erbil alone, and as a team have ventured into new areas like Halabja, and within four miles of the Iranian border. Therefore, the CPT team has relaxed the tight guidelines set prior to our return to Iraq. The team does listen to local voices of caution about particular areas, assesses those warnings, and then decides how to respond. Contacts have urged us to stay away from areas with land mines, especially along the borders, and the Penjeune area on the Iraq-Iran border.
CPT has never hosted a delegation to the KRG, and few other delegations come here, but travel by bus, taxi, and hired drivers is safe, so the movement of a delegation would not be a security concern. This project is operating in a security situation that is better at the present, we believe, than the Colombia and Palestine projects.