by Jerry Levin
Hebron, West Bank, Palestine
February 18, 2006
Tip O'Neill, when he was the extremely
savvy speaker of the U. S. House of Representative once made the following prophecy,
"All politics is local." In that context it should have been no surprise
that Hamas on Election Day in Palestine became an overnight immense political
presence; but…
"Everybody is surprised. They didn't expect Hamas to win it," said
a delighted Jamal, proprietor of a handicrafts shop that caters to a precipitously
declining tourist trade in Hebron's Old City: "Even Hamas didn't expect
to win."
Nodding his head, yes, Jamal's father, the Sheikh, said, "But I wasn't
surprised. The situation encouraged the people to vote for Hamas. The people
who lead Fatah were not good men."
"Before many years ago," Jamal added, "everybody used to be with
Fatah. But the Fatah people, in fact, didn't look after the Palestinian people
and they stole all the money, the money that used to come from the outside to
help the Palestinian."
"So," echoed Abu Osama, a taxi driver in Bethlehem, whose business
has also been driven to the wall because of few tourists, "the people,
he like to see the new faces."
"Why new faces?"
"Because Fatah, since ten years ago, since Oslo, there is much trouble
for my family. No business. No money. No everything."
"Many people voted as a reaction to the Palestinian National Authority
including Palestinian Christians," said Hisham, a Hebron based journalist
and nonviolent independence activist. He describes himself as secular and not
affiliated with Hamas. "Palestinians who are considered leftist and secular
voted for Hamas because they were against the corruption: the use and misuse
of power by the authority. For example," he reported, "thirty percent
of all the workers in the different branches of the Palestinian security services
voted for Hamas; and 90% of the security people are Fatah. Why did they vote
that way? The superiors of those security people were stealing their salaries.
The salaries used to be paid by international donors in dollars and the superiors
used to pay them in shekels: let us say for example 3.5 shekels per dollar while
the actual market rate was 4.5. The superiors stole the difference."
Putting it both delicately and then strongly explicit, Jamal, a school teacher
from Sair, a village a few miles northeast of Hebron, said, "Much money
that came to the leaders in Fatah who handled the finances disappeared in ambiguous
ways. We don't know where. They were stealers, when most Palestinians can't
even get a sack of flour."
Even so, Jamal is not glad that Hamas won so big.
But Zleikha, a teacher, social worker and nonviolent peace activist living in
Hebron's Old City said even before the voting stopped on Election Day she was
sure that Hamas would win big. "I ran into a Fatah friend; and what he
said was shocking to me, because I knew he was a Fatah supporter for many years.
I asked, 'who did you vote for?' And he said, 'Of course Hamas.' And I asked,
why?'
"And he said, 'We needed a change. We supported the peace process and we
supported Oslo, but it was for nothing. So we need to try Hamas.' And he also
said, 'because they are following the teachings of God and the teachings of
the prophet, of course, everybody can trust them more than they can trust Fatah.'"
"There are those who say that Hamas wanted to win big but not so big as
to be the majority party?"
"I don't think so," said Zleikha, "During the election they were
all the time talking about the need for reform and the need for change. So it
seems that they were ready for taking control, and were not surprised by the
result."
But Khalid Amareyh, a Palestinian journalist with an international reputation,
thinks Hamas was surprised by the dimensions of its win. Perhaps his readership
outside Palestine is why he has not been allowed to go on speaking tours in
the United States since returning to the West Bank from his University education
in America in 1983. "Hamas did expect to win," he said, "but
did not expect or hope to win that big. They always wanted to be in a position
to influence the government but not to form the government."
Sami Awad, Bethlehem based founder of Holy Land Trust, a nonviolent grass roots
nonviolent community building organization, agreed with that assessment. "Hamas
wanted to build a base as a shadow government that would create a structure
as an opposition while learning the system, learning the government. They did
not want to be in the forefront. Maybe in four years but not now."
Sami Awad was an independent candidate for the Legislative Council. He didn't
win, but he did garner the most votes in Bethlehem of those who didn't. "Now,
of course, Hamas says they were in it to win and they can't back down from that."
"What does that mean, if they really weren't prepared for this?"
"In the short run, they have already presented themselves in a very professional
way that shows they really are prepared to take on the government. So I don't
see them as failing when it comes to that."
"What problems, if any, does the big win create for Hamas?"
"Hamas must define what its mandate is and what will be its program in
the Palestinian Authority."
I asked Khalid Amareyh the same question.
"Although Hamas is very realistic, it is nevertheless going to face very
formidable geopolitical challenges. But I have to remind you that Hamas never
promised the Palestinian people that they would liberate Palestine after the
elections. All that Hamas did was to promise to try to stem the tide of corruption,
to put an end to misgovernment, to create a transparent egalitarian society,
and to correct and rectify the relationship between the masses and the government."
That assessment seems to square with what one of Hamas' newly elected members
to the Palestinian Legislative Council from the Hebron district is saying. A
few days after the election, Sheikh Nayef Rajoub explained that "the priority
we are trying to establish has to do with the internal Palestinian burden."
The "burden" he explained consists of "several morbid factors
corroding the fabric of our society. The first burden is financial corruption.
Lots of foreign aid comes to the Palestinians but nobody knows where it ends
up. The second burden is the absolute lack of security, the lawlessness, the
chaos especially in the Gaza strip. Especially in the last few weeks and months,
this lawlessness has taken on very worrying manifestations like kidnapping of
international guests in Gaza…foreigners, journalists, even some diplomats.
The third burden is that we would like to enhance our relations with surrounding
countries especially Arab countries…Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia…because
those people are our natural extension. We are also interested sincerely with
good relations with the west especially the United States and the European Union."
So, although all politics does have a serious and consequential local dimension
that can make or break politicians, there is more to political success than
that once they hit the big time. Once inside the Beltway, O'Neill became a master
at handling geopolitical issues, what the Sheikh understands and described as
the Palestinian people's "third burden."
Will Hamas be able to do any better at that than Fatah? A key question that
can be restated this way: now that Hamas has forged a strong partnership with
its people inside the Wall, what are the chances of its finding genuine partners
outside it as well?
(To be continued)