

# **Report and Recommendations on Iraqi Detainees**

## **Christian Peacemaker Teams, Iraq**

### **January 2004**

## **REPORT CONTENTS**

Between May 31 and December 20, 2003, CPT Iraq conducted dozens of interviews of Iraqi detainees and/or their families and support networks. In Section I, this report summarizes the findings from seventy-two cases, and includes recommendations to the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Section II provides the full report, including the case study process and trends identified from the seventy-two cases. Section III is a presentation of the statistical data, including a glossary defining how terms are used.

## **Section I: Report Summary**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), established in 1988, is an independent, faith-based, violence-reduction project, supported by Christian churches across North America. Currently CPT has teams working to reduce violence in Colombia, Hebron, Canada and in Iraq. The Christian foundations of CPT's work leads its workers to believe that all people have the right to live in peace and freedom.

CPT has maintained a presence in Iraq since October 2002. Presently CPT is working with Iraqi human rights organizations and individuals to monitor various interactions between Coalition Forces and the Iraqi people. CPT is particularly concerned that any mistreatment of the Iraqi people could lead to long-term problems including:

1. Increasing numbers of Iraqi people joining resistance groups.
2. Increasing danger of attacks against Coalition soldiers.
3. A growing record of human rights violations against the Iraqi people.

The Coalition has been the governing body of Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime on April 9th, 2003. Since that time, the Coalition Provisional Authority has imprisoned thousands of people. The CPA now has the responsibility of housing those prisoners and separating the guilty from the innocent. The CPA also has additional duties because the International Committee of the Red Cross has left Iraq due to the lack of security. These additional CPA duties are to inform family members of the whereabouts of imprisoned relatives, to report on prisoners' health and well-being, and to arrange family visits.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

CPT has presented the Coalition Provisional Authority with statistical data compiled from seventy-two case studies of Iraqi detainees conducted by CPT Iraq. Our conclusion is straightforward: the military actions designed to ensure short-term security are in fact compromising long-term security interests of Iraqis and all internationals, including the CPA. The following trends highlight problems that need immediate attention and policy development.

**1. Violent House Raids:** House raids terrify Iraqi children and heap shame on Iraqi women who are pulled from their beds wearing only nightclothes. In a Muslim culture, this is particularly offensive, and Iraqi men and boys are incensed by this treatment. Their understandable anger and frustration ultimately puts every soldier at risk. CPT strongly recommends ending such midnight raids.

**2. Lack of family visits** with prisoners is causing frustration and anger. In addition, many families trying to visit prisoners receive misleading directions. For instance, it is clear that appointments for visitation at Abu-Ghraib must be made at the prison. But on 13 December 2003, when CPT members accompanied several family members to Abu-Ghraib west of Baghdad, U.S. guards told us that families could only make appointments at a place near the Rasheed Hotel in Baghdad. Finally, the waiting time for an appointment is six months. CPT strongly urges the CPA to make it easier for families to visit detainees and obtain information about them. In doing so, the U.S. can model transparency and commitment to human rights for the rest of the international community.

**3. Health Concerns:** Families have no way to inquire about the health and well-being of prisoners. This is particularly distressing when families know that their detained loved ones were injured at the time of their arrest. CPT has no examples of families who were able to obtain information about the health of detainees who were injured and taken to hospital at the time of their arrests. Family members often report that detained relatives have chronic health problems such as diabetes, heart disease, or high blood pressure. CPT urges the CPA to allow family members access to all information pertaining to the health of detainees.

**4. Mistreatment of Detainees:** CPT volunteers have talked to released detainees. All reported that they were housed in overcrowded tents without proper clothes or toilet facilities, particularly in the initial detention centers to which they were taken. CPT volunteers saw handcuffed prisoners being led around with black plastic bags over their heads at an army base near Balad on December 24th, 2003. This sort of treatment – and worse – is often reported by released detainees. Such treatment violates the 4th Geneva Convention (Article 85) and angers detainees and their families, causing increased security risks to Coalition forces from an increasingly-alienated populace.

**5. Theft of Property:** CPT has heard many stories about Coalition forces confiscating money and property during house raids. We have heard Iraqis refer to this confiscation of money and property as "theft." We have not heard of any instances in which Coalition forces gave the owners receipts for confiscated property. We know of only one incident in which confiscated property (a computer) was returned. CPT urges Coalition forces to cease unnecessary confiscation of property, to issue receipts when confiscation is necessary, and to return all

property that has been unjustly confiscated.

**6. Ineffective Application Process for Confiscated Property:** Many people who have applied for compensation for damaged and confiscated property have not received any written proof of their application. They have also not received any documents communicating decisions on compensation. Because there is no paper trail, CPT has no evidence that the CPA has paid any compensation to families, even when CPA officials have made verbal agreements to do so. CPT urges the CPA to document and follow through on all requests for compensation, and to give families copies of all documents relating to compensation.

**7. Inaccessibility of Information:** CPT has no evidence to suggest that the CPA has ever initiated any communication with Iraqi citizens about imprisoned relatives, the return of confiscated property or compensation for damaged property. We believe that Iraqi citizens have to be extremely persistent to get any information from the occupying Coalition. Iraqis are increasingly frustrated and angered by failed attempts to get straightforward, truthful answers to questions asked of Coalition officers. CPT strongly urges the CPA to share information with families and legal representatives of detainees.

**8. Lack of Security:** Iraqis live in fear because of the lack of security. They say that the criminals arrested every day by Iraqi police are then freed within a few days by Coalition authorities. Meanwhile, innocent detainees are held for months. Iraqis perceive that the CPA is targeting the wrong people. The CPA still needs to convince Iraqis that it is doing all it can to free the streets of common thieves, and release innocent detainees.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Developing a process for handling detainee issues that is transparent, efficient, and that upholds basic legal rights is essential for establishing a secure and democratic society. The Coalition Provisional Authority can best lay the foundation for this policy by working in partnership with Iraqi human rights organizations and with lawyers who have been responding to the problems of detainees. A more open approach that attends to the concerns of families and more freely shares information will, in the long run, provide better security for both Iraqi civilians and Coalition soldiers and personnel. The CPA could model the sort of justice system most desirable for a future free, democratic Iraq.

**Section II: Findings from 72 Iraqi Detainee Case Studies**  
**Case Studies Conducted May 31 to December 20, 2003**  
**Christian Peacemaker Teams, Baghdad, Iraq**  
Compiled by Matthew Chandler, 21 December 2003

## **CPT'S WORK IN IRAQ**

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) is an independent, faith-based organization committed to reducing violence sponsored and supported by Christian churches across North America, especially by Mennonite, Brethren and Quaker denominations. CPT has maintained a violence-reduction presence in Iraq since October 2002. The team's activities have included:

- \$ pre-invasion, providing on-the-ground information to decision-makers and the media
- \$ seeking to protect vital civil infrastructure facilities during the war in March and April 2003
- \$ observing and documenting the Coalition's post-invasion activities and consequential damages during the war and the following occupation
- \$ supporting non-violent efforts of local Iraqis for justice and peace
- \$ working to open lines of communication between Iraqi human rights workers and Coalition representatives
- \$ advocating for just and humane treatment of persons the Coalition Forces have detained and the family members of these detainees
- \$ campaigning for changes in or development of Coalition policies which threaten the safety of Coalition soldiers, contracted workers and Iraqi civilians.

## **THIS REPORT**

Between May 31 and December 20, 2003, CPT workers conducted extensive interviews and collected testimonies related to the detention of Iraqi civilians. Testimonies came from detainees, friends and family of detainees, and information obtained from Coalition Forces representatives and/or contracted workers for the Coalition. This report is a summary of that information.

## **CONFLICT CONTEXT**

During the major military operations in Iraq (March 19 to May 1, 2003), Coalition Forces captured thousands of Iraqis. Some were members of opposition forces and duly classified as prisoners of war. Some were common citizens who happened to be in the way of Coalition Forces and were captured as civilian interns. Others were charged with involvement with opposition forces, resistance groups, foreign terrorist groups, or the former regime and were captured as security detainees.

In order to accommodate these captives, Coalition Forces created makeshift detention camps, some of which were adapted from existing facilities, and many which were built. Many interns and prisoners of war captured during the major military operations have since

been released. However, as the sole governing body in Iraq after Saddam Hussein's regime fell on April 9, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority acquired responsibility for criminals incarcerated at all levels in Iraq's penal system.

Since that time, Coalition Forces have employed thousands of Iraqi policemen and dozens of Iraqi judges to manage the bulk of Iraqi criminal cases. Still, Coalition Forces continue to capture and indefinitely detain persons whom they accuse of crimes against the Coalition and classify as security detainees. Details on these persons – the total number, their whereabouts, legal processes, etc. – remain undisclosed by the Coalition.

## **CPT'S WORK ON DETAINEES**

Christian Peacemaker Teams first became involved with detainee issues in May of 2003 when Iraqis came to team members asking for help in finding information about their detained relatives. Working on their behalf, CPT members found it extremely difficult to obtain accurate information about detainees. After pressing military officers at the Coalition's Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC) in Baghdad, CPT members were able to obtain limited information on the location of a few detainees. The families were relieved to know their relatives were alive and relatively safe. Some family members were able to visit their relatives in the Coalition detention camps.

During this process, CPT recognized that hundreds of detainees' family members were frantically trying to get information about their relatives. Literally crying out for attention, families crowded at the concrete barriers and barb-wired gates of the various Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC), where some CPA detention camps are located. Families attempted to visit the Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC), which has several armed checkpoints significantly limiting accessibility for Iraqis. And families appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local human rights groups pleading for assistance. With almost no communication between the CPA and civilian Iraqis, the gravity of the problem was clear. Family members were furious or devastated when they failed to find information, calling down curses on the Coalition and equating it with Saddam's regime.

In early summer in 2003, CPT members devoted significant effort to assisting families of detainees and investigating the Coalition's process for capturing, detaining and processing persons accused of crimes against the Coalition. By the middle of September, CPT had taken on dozens of cases and was devoting the majority of its resources to issues relating to detainees.

## **THE DETAINEE CASE PROCESS**

CPT acquires detainee cases through a number of channels, including from friends of the team, walk-ins, contacts through local human rights groups, and contacts through local mosques. The general process by which CPT attempts to help relatives of detainees follows.

**Taking Testimonies** – Testimonies are taken from detainees' family members or other reputable contacts (lawyers at human rights groups or sheikhs at local mosques) regarding

the detainees' backgrounds and circumstances of the capture. When possible, CPT documents evidence of the detainees' capture – e.g. photographing the bullet holes in the windows of the detainees' houses left by Coalition Forces the raid in which they were captured.

**Accompanying Families to Visit Authorities** – Go with relatives or other contacts of detainees to places where Coalition spokespersons have said Iraqis can get information – Iraqi police stations, CMOCs (now called General Information Centers) mostly operated by Iraqis, and the IAC – and applying pressure to obtain information. Often, the process halts at this stage because personnel at the information centers either have no information or are unwilling to disclose information.

**Attempting to Visit the Detainee** – If relatives are able to get information on the detainee's location, most try to visit the detainees. In a few instances, CPT members accompanied relatives to the detention camp at Baghdad International Airport where Coalition forces refused them entry without reason every time. In more-successful cases, CPT members accompanied relatives to the Bucca detention camp in Um Qasr, located approximately 600 miles to the south of Baghdad, where they experienced some success in getting visitation appointments. After CPT's initial success in Um Qasr, many relatives felt empowered to travel there and schedule appointments for themselves. A U.S. Major in charge of visitations made significant efforts to help these Iraqi families. The Coalition, however, then transferred most of Bucca's detainees to Abu Ghraib prison just west of Baghdad where visitations involving CPT's cases have been denied.

**Further Investigation** – Many detainee's families and contacts insist that the detainees are being held unjustly and request CPT's help in pursuing justice. Using local contacts, CPT investigates the background and character of the detainee and his relatives, and the circumstances of the detainees' capture. A detainee's guilt or innocence cannot be proven at this stage. Still, when CPT feels strongly it is unlikely the detainee is guilty, and in situations where family members rely on the detainee for support, CPT makes special efforts to pressure the Coalition to release the detainee. Regardless of issues of innocence or guilt, CPT presses the Coalition for a speedy, fair, and transparent process in handling detainees.

**Pursuing Detainees' Release** – CPT attempts to work for a detainee's release by meeting with the highest ranking officers possible at relevant CPA offices, reporting to them the findings of CPT's investigation, and occasionally submitting written statements from relatives of detainees appealing for the immediate release. Appeals are usually heard by captains and majors, but in a few cases CPT met with colonels. In some cases, CPA representatives say they simply cannot do anything to help. In other cases, Coalition representatives express concern and agree to relay messages to their superiors. In a few cases, CPA representatives agreed to make a special recommendation for the release of certain detainees. In all cases, however, CPA representatives have insisted they do not have authority to release detainees, and that regardless of the circumstances the processes will be slow. Still, a handful of detainees for which CPT had been advocating were released. While families are thankful for CPT's involvement in the release, team members have no way of measuring the degree to which CPT actually contributed to the release.

**Interviewing the Released Detainee** – CPT members have taken testimonies from several released detainees, and their accounts are reflected in the statistical report below.

**Publishing Testimonies/Reports** – Publishing testimonies and reports may occur at any point, depending on the circumstances of the cases. Many detainees have reported abuse at the hands of Coalition forces. The goal in publishing these documents is to raise awareness within North American constituencies about the detainee situation and to encourage the public pressure of Coalition policy-makers to improve the problem. The detainee situation is a source of major frustration for Iraqis. Without remediation, it feeds into the general sense of opposition to the Coalition presence. For the safety of both Iraqi detainees and Coalition forces, the situation must be improved.

## **CONSERVATIVE TABULATION**

The summary below reflects seventy-two of the cases for which CPT invested the most resources. Hundreds more cases like these exist; already working at capacity, CPT has turned away Iraqi appeals almost daily. The amount of CPT involvement with these cases varies significantly. At a minimum, in every case CPT conducted initial interviews and accompanied relatives in an attempt to find information on the detainee. In some cases, however, CPT involvement has been extensive. Team members repeatedly attempted to get information about certain detainees, visited the detainees held by Coalition Forces, and forged relationships with relatives of detainees and/or former detainees themselves.

In compiling this summary, reporting has erred on the conservative side in an effort to produce a report free of slander. Information reported with certainty has been confirmed by CPT through reputable sources. Intense emotions affect persons' memories, and CPT is not qualified to psychoanalyze people or administer polygraphs. Thus, reported incidences of damage, injury, property confiscation, or abuse are listed as "reported instances," rather than as "known instances."

The tabulation of occurrences is especially conservative. For example, if a detainee reported in his testimony that he was "beaten many times by the guards at the Airport," the tabulation reflects only two reported instances of the minimum form of abuse: hitting with hands. If, however, the detainee was specific and detailed about his abuse – including the exact type of abuse, the place and approximate time, and the number of instances – the report records the number of instances as reported by the detainee. The same method applies to all of the categories in the report. Definitions of abuse types follow the summary.

## **PROBLEMATIC TRENDS**

In the course of this research into the way in which the Coalition apprehends and manages detainees, a number of problematic trends and patterns emerged. The following are the most serious.

### **House Raids**

**Raids and Detentions Based on Bad Information** – Since the end of major military operations, Coalition Forces have been on the hunt for suspected insurgents, Baathists and terrorists in an attempt to cleanly sweep Iraq of all violent resisters. Coalition Forces

frequently raid citizens' homes in the middle of the night. Iraqis dispute the basis for many of these raids for two main reasons: 1) Iraqis allege that the Coalition Forces are acting on false information provided by other Iraqis who want to manipulate Coalition Forces to settle old scores; 2) Iraqis complain that when Coalition Forces mistakenly raid houses, they often capture the male residents even after learning the house was not the intended target. Although military intelligence files are classified, several Coalition representatives have admitted to CPT that both scenarios do in fact happen. Representatives have acknowledged these as significant problems, but have expressed no intent to try to improve operations.

**Excessive Use of Force and Property Damage** – Behaving as if target houses contain armed militants, Coalition Forces storm the buildings in the middle of the night in the same manner that they storm military facilities, awakening families with small children. Soldiers often break through the front gate with armored vehicles or explosives and break down doors and/or windows of the house with their weapons aimed at anything that moves. Sometimes they come in shooting. In nearly all of the cases reporting house raids, families first assumed that the soldiers were looters and they prepared themselves to defend their family and property. Whether by error or by intent, CPT reports show a trend of soldiers damaging significant property and frequently injuring captured persons and/or their family members during house raids.

**Confiscation of Personal Property** – CPT reports indicate a trend of Coalition Forces confiscating legal property, such as money and jewelry, without giving receipts.

**Detention Without Explanation** – Soldiers do not explain the charges leveled against the captured Iraqis.

**Raids Result in Iraqi Resentment** – Whether they themselves have fallen victim to these trends or not, most Iraqis are aware of these problems and are angry at the Coalition as a result. In summary, CPT strongly believes that Coalition Forces create more resistance fighters every time they raid a house, even if the persons inside the house are guilty of crimes against the Coalition.

The common sentiment is that the Coalition treatment of detainees is as bad as, if not worse than, treatment under the Hussein regime. Certainly, these problems are exaggerated in rumors, but CPT reports show that detention conditions are deplorable at best. Undoubtedly, these conditions exacerbate growing resentment against the Coalition, which feeds violent resistance movements in Iraq.

### **Treatment of Detainees**

**Unsatisfactory Facilities** – Testimonies of released detainees indicate that detention conditions are far below satisfactory. All interviewed detainees reported staying in crowded tents, often sleeping on the desert floor with improper bedding, and being mixed-in with convicted criminals. In addition, detainees report a lack of food and/or very poor quality food, lack of water and/or very poor quality water (due to contamination from chemicals), and overcrowded quarters. Those released detainees who reported abuse while in detention, most reported that the abuse they experienced occurred at either a local military base where

they were first taken or at the Airport (a.k.a. Camp Victory).

**Location of Detention Facility** – Detainees are often transferred to a facility that is a long distance from their home, making it impossible for many relatives of detainees to visit because they lack the necessary resources to make a long journey. CPT has found that camp Bucca in Um Qasr, once a primary holding facility for the Coalition, had the best visitation system but was also the farthest camp from Baghdad in Iraq. It also boasts the highest summer temperatures in the country.

**Inadequate Communication with Families** – While detainees suffer from sub-standard detention conditions, their families and friends suffer from a general inability to communicate with their captured relatives, or to even get basic information about them. To CPT's knowledge, Coalition representatives have never provided information to a detainee's family of their own volition. Rather, most relatives spend hours and hours trying to learn basic facts – location, status, health – about the detainee. Dozens of families daily gather at the gates of Coalition detention facilities, trying desperately to get information about their detained relatives. Frequently, the only way families learn anything about their detained relative is from other released detainees who carry messages to the family. Only after much persistence have CPT members been able to acquire any information about detainees.

### **Breeding Resentment**

A large majority of Iraqis with whom CPT had contact find particularly intolerable: (1) the lack of any meaningful Coalition system to communicate information about detainees; (2) the unsatisfactory detention facilities; (3) the heavy-handed Coalition raids on houses. They feel betrayed by Coalition leaders who promised an end to totalitarianism and a new future of freedom, democracy and justice, yet who – according to these Iraqis' perception – seem to act just as secretly, dishonestly and unsympathetically as Saddam. Moreover, they feel the Coalition has insulted their dignity by forcing them to do such things as crowd in earthen lots under the hot sun for hours just to get a contracted translator to check for their detained relatives' prison numbers so they can get visits. Since the occupation began, these circumstances have barely improved. Many Iraqis have already lost patience, and many others are losing their's quickly, replaced by resentment and aggression against the Coalition; violent resistance movements are gaining credibility among the public.

### **REPORTING THE SITUATION**

CPT has voiced these concerns to commissioned officers \_ some who rank as high as colonel. Some officers have listened to these concerns and agreed that the safety of every Coalition soldier is wrapped up in how Iraqis perceive the behavior of Coalition representatives. However, the problems these trends indicate largely stem from decisions made by policy-makers rather than field officers and soldiers. Thus, CPT has created this report not only as reference for persons who are curious about CPT's work in Iraq, but also as a resource for persons who want to impress upon Coalition policy-makers the need to make better decisions which will lead to more safety for Iraqis as well as Coalition soldiers.

## Section III: Statistical Summary

Total number of cases represented below of persons detained by Coalition Forces (Coalition Forces): 72

### I. Demographic Information

#### A. Gender

- i. 71 men
- ii. 1 woman

#### B. Age

- i. Range: 16 to 74 years
- ii. Average age: 32 years
- iii. Number of minors: 1 (16 years)

#### C. Nationality

##### i. Number of Iraqi nationals: 65

##### a. Home locations:

- 1. Baghdad: 54
  - al-Aadhumiya: 27
  - al-Jehad: 3
  - al-Qadasiya: 3
  - al-Ghazaliya: 2
  - al-Saab: 1
  - al-Ameriya: 2
  - al-Saidai: 1
  - al-Majhtel: 1
  - al-Nasir: 1
  - al-Monsour: 1
  - al-Salhiya: 1
  - al-Dora: 1
  - al-Thawra: 1
  - al-Sayediyah: 1
  - al-Hader: 1
- 2. al-Ramadi: 2
- 3. Diala: 2
- 4. Kerbala: 1
- 5. al-Samwaw: 1
- 6. Unknown city: 5

##### ii. Number of Iranian nationals: 4

##### iii. Number of persons whose nationality Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) does not know: 3

## II. Capture Information

### A. Date of Capture

- i. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly captured the person during major military operations (19 March \_ 1 May 03): 6
- ii. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly captured the person after major military operations (2 May 03 \_ present): 63
- iii. Cases in which CPT does not know the date of capture: 3

### B. Charges Against the Captive

- i. Cases in which CPT knows the captive was accused of a civil crime(s): 0
- ii. Cases in which CPT knows the captive was accused of a crime(s) against Coalition Forces: 27

### C. Place of Capture

- i. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly captured the person in his home: 25
- ii. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly captured the person outside his/her home: 23

### D. Method of Capture

- i. Cases in which CPT knows Coalition Forces captured the person during a raid on his home: 25
  - a. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly used a humvee(s) and foot soldiers without gunfire or explosives: 15
  - b. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly used a humvee(s) and foot soldiers with gunfire and/or explosives: 10
  - c. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly used a large armored vehicle(s) without gun/cannon fire: 4
  - d. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly used a large armored vehicle(s) with gun/cannon fire: 0
  - e. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly used a helicopter(s) without gun or rocket fire: 7
  - f. Cases in which Coalition Forces reportedly used a helicopter(s) with gun and/or rocket fire: 0
- ii. Cases in which Coalition Forces raided the same house more than once: 2
- iii. Cases in which Coalition Forces admitted error for the raid at the event of the raid: 4
  - a. Cases in which Coalition Forces captured the person after an admission of error: 4
- iv. Cases in which persons in the house physically resisted the raiding Coalition Forces: 1
  - v. Cases in which Coalition Forces damaged property of the captive and/or his family during the house raid: 16
    - a. Cases in which Coalition Forces damaged property by gunfire: 9
    - b. Cases in which Coalition Forces damaged property by explosives: 7
    - c. Cases in which Coalition Forces damaged property by military vehicles: 4
    - d. Cases in which Coalition Forces damaged property by soldiers, physically: 5
- vi. Cases in which Coalition Forces injured the captive during the raid: 10
  - a. Reported instances of injury by gunfire: 2
  - b. Reported instances of injury by glass or shrapnel: 0
  - c. Reported instances of injury by physical force: 8

1. Reported instances of injury by hitting with hands: 6
  2. Reported instances of injury by hitting with weapons: 3
  3. Reported instances of injury by kicking: 3
  4. Reported instances of injury by stomping: 3
  5. Reported instances of injury by shoving: 1
- vii. Cases in which Coalition Forces injured the captive's family members during the raid:

6

- a. Total number of family members of captives injured: 7
  1. Reported instances of injury by gunfire: 3
  2. Reported instances of injury by glass or shrapnel: 1
  3. Reported instances of injury by physical force: 1
    - Reported instances of injury by hitting with hands: 0
    - Reported instances of injury by hitting with weapon: 0
    - Reported instances of injury by kicking: 1
    - Reported instances of injury by stomping: 1
    - Reported instances of injury by shoving: 0
- b. Number of family members who died as a result of these injuries: 2

#### E. Property Confiscation

- i. Cases in which Coalition Forces confiscated property of the captive or his/her family: 24
  - a. Reported instances of Coalition Forces confiscating firearms: 3
  - b. Reported instances of Coalition Forces confiscating money: 6
  - c. Reported instances of Coalition Forces confiscating jewelry: 4
  - d. Reported instances of Coalition Forces confiscating electronics: 4
  - e. Reported instances of Coalition Forces confiscating other property: 4
  - f. Reported instances of Coalition Forces giving receipts for confiscated property: 0
  - g. Cases in which CPT knows Coalition Forces returned all confiscated property: 0
  - h. Cases in which CPT knows Coalition Forces returned partial amounts of confiscated property: 1

### III. Detention Information

#### A. Place of Detention

- i. Number of detainees CPT knows have spent time in the following Coalition Forces facilities:
  - a. Camp Bucca, Um Qasr: 27
  - b. Baghdad International Airport: 21
  - c. Abu Ghraib, Baghdad: 16
  - d. Nasariya: 5
  - e. Ibn Sina Hospital, Coalition Headquarters, Baghdad: 2
  - f. BCoalition Forces: 1
  - g. Baquba: 1
  - h. Tikrit: 1
  - i. al-Shaab Stadium, Baghdad: 1

#### B. Current Status of Detainees

- i. Cases in which CPT knows Coalition Forces have released the detainee: 24

- a. Range of length of detention: 3 days to 200 days
- b. Average length of detention: 57 days
- c. Cases in which the detainee was convicted of a crime: 0
- ii. Cases in which CPT's reports show Coalition Forces are still holding the detainee: 38
  - a. Cases in which CPT knows Coalition Forces have allowed the detainee legal council: 0
  - b. Cases in which CPT knows Coalition Forces have reviewed the detainee's case: 0
  - c. Cases in which CPT knows the detainee has had a trial: 0
  - d. Cases in which CPT knows the detainee has been convicted of a crime: 0

#### C. Coalition Forces's Treatment of Detainees

i. Cases in which Coalition Forces and/or contracted workers reportedly abused the detainee: 10

- a. Reported instances of hitting with hands: 11
- b. Reported instances of hitting with other objects: 1
- c. Reported instances of kicking: 5
- d. Reported instances of stomping: 2
- e. Reported instances of aggressive shoving: 6
- f. Reported instances of other physical abuse: 2
- g. Reported instances of excessively tight handcuffing: 4
- h. Reported instances of prolonged handcuffing: 10
- i. Reported instances of prolonged forced kneeling: 7
- j. Reported instances of prolonged exposure to sunlight: 4
- k. Reported instances of prolonged covering of eyes: 3
- l. Reported instances of prolonged exposure to loud music: 2
- m. Reported instances of deprivation of food: 3
- n. Reported instances of deprivation of water: 11
- o. Reported instances of deprivation of minimal sanitary conditions: 2
- p. Reported instances of deprivation of urination privileges: 1
- q. Reported instances of refusal of necessary medical care: 2
- r. Reported instances of electrocution: 1
- s. Reported instances of prying off a toenail: 1
- t. Reported instances of psychological abuse: 3

#### D. Communication of Information about Detainees

i Cases in which Coalition Forces/contracted workers gave information about the detainee to family or friends: 33

- a. Reported instances of info. given at initiation of Coalition Forces/contracted workers: 0
- b. Reported instances of info. given at first request of family/friends: 7
- c. Reported instances of info. given only after family, friends and/or CPT persisted: 32
  - d. Reported instances of info. given only after family members paid a bribe to Coalition Forces/contracted workers: 2
- e. Reported instances in which info. given turned out to be false: 8
  - ii. Reported instances of family or friends attempting to get info. from Coalition Forces or contracted workers and failing: 100

iii. Cases in which the ICRC gave info. about detainees to family or friends: 2

- a. Reported instances of info. given at the initiation of the ICRC: 0

- b. Reported instances of info. given at the request of family/friends: 2
  - iv. Reported instances of family or friends attempting to get info. from the ICRC and failing: 11
- v. Cases in which the Iraqi Police (IP) gave info. about detainees to family or friends: 4
  - a. Reported instances of info. given at the initiation of the IP: 1
  - b. Reported instances of info. given at the request of family/friends: 3
- vi. Reported instances of family or friends attempting to get info. from the IP and failing: 3

#### E. Visitations

- i. Cases in which family tried to schedule a visit(s) with detainees: 29
  - a. Cases in which family members were able to visit detainees: 11
  - b. Reported instances of failed attempts to schedule visits: 10

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Hitting with hands:** Intentionally striking part of a person's body with one's hand in either a lateral or a vertical motion (e.g. boxing a person in the nose, chopping a person on the neck, etc.)

**Hitting with other objects:** Intentionally striking part of a person's body with a solid object manipulated by one's hands in either a lateral or a vertical motion (e.g. striking a person in the mouth with the butt of an M-16 rifle, striking a person on the shoulder with a club, etc.).

**Kicking:** Intentionally striking part of a person's body with one's foot in a lateral motion (e.g. striking a person in the ribs with one's foot while the person is lying on the ground, etc.).

**Stomping:** Intentionally striking or pressing heavily in part of a person's body with one's foot in a vertical motion (e.g. striking a person on the back with the sole of one's foot while the person is lying face-down on the ground, pressing heavily with one's foot on the back of a person's head while the person is lying face-down on the ground, etc.).

**Aggressive shoving:** Intentionally thrusting a person with one's hands, arms, foot, leg, and/or body such that the person falls violently to the ground, against the wall, or against another solid object (e.g. thrusting a person with one's hands such that the person collides with the wall, etc.).

**Other physical abuse:** Intentionally inflicting pain on a person with one's body or with an object manipulated by one's hands (e.g. boring one's fist into a person's chest, strangling a person with one's hands, etc.).

**Excessively tight handcuffing:** Intentionally tying a person's hands together such that the person's hands immediately swell or go numb, are lacerated, or soon develop blisters.

**Prolonged handcuffing:** Intentionally or negligently leaving a person's hands tied together behind the person's back for more than three or four hours.

Prolonged forced kneeling: Intentionally forcing a person to kneel on his knees for more than two continuous hours, such that the person's legs go numb and/or cramp.

Prolonged exposure to sunlight: Intentionally or negligently forcing a person to remain in the sunlight for more than three or four continuous hours, such that the person develops a burn, becomes dehydrated, and/or experiences heat exhaustion.

Prolonged covering of eyes: Intentionally or negligently leaving a person's eyes covered for more than three or four hours, such that the person becomes disoriented.

Prolonged exposure to loud music: Intentionally or negligently subjecting a person to music at a high enough volume to inflict pain to the person's ears for more than one hour.

Deprivation of food: Intentionally or negligently withholding any food from a person for more than twelve hours, or intentionally withholding necessary amounts of food for more than one day (e.g. providing a person with only one spoonful of food per day for three days).

Deprivation of water: Intentionally or negligently withholding any water from person for more than three hours in high temperature settings, or intentionally withholding necessary amounts of water for more than one day (e.g. providing a person with only one liter of water per day for three days when the temperature exceeds 90 F each day).

Deprivation of minimal sanitary conditions: Intentionally or negligently failing to provide a person with opportunities to bathe, proper urination/defecation facilities or minimally sanitary living quarters for more than one week.

Deprivation of urination privileges: Intentionally preventing a person from using urination facilities, such that the person loses control of the person's bladder.

Refusal of necessary medical care: Intentionally or negligently refusing to give medical aid to a person in a situation of medical emergency (e.g. refusing to take a person to the hospital when the person has fainted and remains unconscious).

Electrocution: Intentionally shocking a person with painful amounts of electricity (e.g. shocking a person with a cattle prod for three minutes).

Prying off a toenail: Intentionally and forcefully removing a person's healthy toenail.

Psychological abuse: Intentionally subjecting a person to conditions that cause the person severe mental stress, disorientation, severe anxiety, and/or traumatic fear (e.g. blindfolding a person and his brother, forcing them to kneel next to each other, faking beating and shooting the brother, telling the person one killed his brother and will kill the person next, cocking one's gun, placing it to the person's head, and pretending to shoot).

Note: All of the examples given in the above definitions reflect actual testimonies from CPT investigations.

## **ABOUT CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKER TEAMS**

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) is an independent, faith-based, violence-reduction project, sponsored and supported by Christian churches across North America, especially by Mennonite, Brethren and Quaker denominations. CPT has placed violence-reduction teams and/or delegations in the following locations since its genesis in 1988: Hebron, Palestine; Chiapas, Mexico; Barrancabermeja, Colombia; New Brunswick and Ontario, Canada; South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, D.C. and New York, USA; Vieques, Puerto Rico; Bosnia; Haiti; Afghanistan; and Iraq. CPT's violence-reduction work around the world is based on members' Christian faith, inspired by Jesus of Nazareth's example, as well as by other leaders, such as Gandhi, Badsha Khan, Martin Luther King, Jr. and peacemakers from other religions and traditions.

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